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I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, ON Semiconductor Company completed its acquisition of SANYO
1
Semiconductor from SANYO Electric on January 3, 2011. The acquisition
2
continued ON Semiconductor’s transformation into a premier global supplier.
The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of ON Semiconductor emphasized that the
acquisition enabled them to expand into the Japanese market and capture growth
3
on a global basis. This acquisition was made possible because of SANYO
Electric’s restructuring by demerging its unprofitable semiconductor unit into a
4
wholly owned subsidiary. Prior to this acquisition, Hitachi and Mitsubishi
Electric Corporation took advantage of special provisions under the Japanese
5
Commercial Code for corporate reorganizations. They jointly established a new
company, Renesas Technology Corp., and spun off both companies’
6
semiconductor businesses into Renesas. At the time, Renesas became one of the
7
top three semiconductor companies in the world.
These successful demergers promoted the creation of the Japanese Bunkatsu
Law, which eliminates impediments and facilitates corporate restructuring of
8
Japanese companies. The term bunkatsu means demerger in Japanese and is
9
similar to business transfers or asset sales in the United States. A demerger
10
consists of a company splitting into two or more independent entities. In the
11
United States, this is referred to as a spin-off. The kaisha bunkatsu is a type of
12
corporate division (demerger) in Japan. It is a lawful way to restructure a failing

1. ON Semiconductor Completes Acquisition of SANYO Semiconductor from SANYO Electric, ON
SEMICONDUCTOR (Jan. 3, 2011), http://www.onsemi.com/PowerSolutions/newsItem.do?article=2458.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Sanyo Electric to Sell Semiconductor Unit to U.S. Firm, ISTOCKANALYST (July 2, 2010, 7:06 AM),
http://www.istockanalyst.com/article/viewiStockNews/articleid/4272805.
5. See Hitachi and Mitsubishi Electric to Establish Renesas Technology Corp., A New Company for
Semiconductor Operations, MITSUBISHI ELECTRIC (Oct. 3, 2002), http://www.mitsubishielectric.com/news/
news_releases/2002/mel0553.html.
6. See id.
7. See Hitachi, Mitsubishi Chip Merger Forms Powerhouse, EXTREME TECH (Oct. 3, 2002, 3:38 PM),
http://www.extremetech.com/extreme/52106-hitachi-mitsubishi-chip-merger-forms-powerhouse.
8. Why Japan’s New Corporate Separation Law is Increasing Restructurings, IFLR (Jan. 28, 2003),
http://www.iflr.com/Article/2026997/Why-Japans-new-corporate-separation-law-is-increasingrestructurings.html.
9. See Christopher T. Hines, et al., Doing Deals in Japan: An Analysis of Recent Trends and
Developments for the U.S. Practitioner, COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 355, 388 (2006).
10. Thomas Kirchmaier, Corporate Demergers: or is Divorce More Attractive than Marriage?
CENTREPIECE, 15 (2001), http://cep.lse.ac.uk/centrepiece/v06i1/kirchmaier.pdf.
11. Id.
12. ABA Section of Antitrust Law, COMPETITION LAWS OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES, FIRST
SUPPLEMENT, 323 (Daniel G. Swanson et. al. eds., 2005).
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business or promote a healthy portion of a business. The law allows Japanese
entities to split out business units and make them standalone entities by
“operation of law,” meaning that any relevant consent of creditors or contract
14
counterparties are not required. Many companies use the kaisha bunkatsu
15
legitimately to further their position in the Japanese market. For example, the
ON Semiconductor purchase agreement had specific provisions for contracts
16
pertaining to the demerger. However, illegitimate use of the kaisha bunkatsu is
17
apparent among mid-size and family owned Japanese companies. This presents
an issue to the Ministry of Japan because business owners are successfully
18
abusing the kaisha bunkatsu.
The future possibility of major corporations abusing the kaisha bunkatsu
needs to be considered because the primary focus of the abuse pertains to the
19
rights of creditors. Creditors remaining with the parent company are subject to
the possibility of having no recourse in receiving payment from the debtor parent
20
company and the newly formed company. The current construction of the
21
kaisha bunkatsu allows creditors to be left with no recourse. In spite of this
issue, the United States has recognized a kaisha bunkatsu (demerger): ON
22
Semiconductor and SANYO Semiconductor in Arizona. The United States
recognizes that the kaisha bunkatsu is a positive notion, but with the potential
23
abuse of the kaisha bunkatsu, states might not recognize or enforce the
24
demerger because it conflicts with their corporate laws.
This Comment addresses the potential conflict of laws issue with the
enforceability of the kaisha bunkatsu in California. Part II describes the
difference between the kaisha bunkatsu and the United States law governing
25
spin-offs. Part III examines the issue between creditor’s protections in Japan
26
and California. Part IV creates an illustration of the potential problem a United
13. See Ko Wakabayashi & Yoshimune Muraji, Abusive Company Splits: Use and Abuse, IFLR (Apr. 1,
2012), http://www.iflr.com/Article/3007268/Abusive-company-splits-Use-and-abuse.html.
14. See Why Japan’s New Corporate Separation Law is Increasing Restructurings, supra note 8.
15. See ON Semiconductor Completes Acquisition of SANYO Semiconductor from SANYO Electric, supra
note 1; Hitachi and Mitsubishi Electric to Establish Renesas Technology Corp., A New Company for
Semiconductor Operations, supra note 6; Wakabayashi & Muraji, supra note 13.
16. ON Semiconductor and SANYO Semiconductor Purchase Agreement
17. See Wakabayashi & Muraji, supra note 13.
18. See id.
19. See infra Part V.
20. See Wakabayashi & Muraji, supra note 13.
21. See KAISHA-HOU [Corporation Law] [Companies Act], Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 763 (Japan);
Wakabayashi & Muraji, supra note 13.
22. ON Semiconductor Completes Acquisition of SANYO Semiconductor from SANYO Electric, supra
note 1.
23. See Wakabayashi & Muraji, supra note 13.
24. See Cal. Corp. Code §1107 (Deering 2014); see also Cal. Corp. Code § 1113 (Deering 2014).
25. See infra Part II.
26. See infra Part III.
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States creditor could face if Japan does not amend the kaisha bunkatsu. This
Comment will argue the kaisha bunkatsu is an effective tool for corporate
restructuring and global economic development, and therefore California courts
should recognize the kaisha bunkatsu and apply California corporation laws,
28
providing protection to creditors. Additionally, Japan should amend the kaisha
29
bunkatsu in order to provide the same.
II. SPIN-OFFS
A. Brief Overview
A spin-off is the distribution of stock in a subsidiary corporation by a parent
30
corporation to its existing shareholders. The shareholders of the parent company
31
are not required to surrender any stock in return. This transaction allows the
32
business to operate in separate corporations. The split of the business will either
form a parent-subsidiary relation or two corporations with a common holding
33
company.

27. See infra Part IV.
28. See infra Part V.
29. See infra Part V.A.
30. Edwards S. Adams & Arijit Mukherji, Spin-offs, Fiduciary Duty, and The Law, 68 FORDHAM L. REV.
15, 17 (1999-2000).
31. Id.
32. FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, BUSINESS PLANNING 863 (Thomson Reuters/Foundation Press, 4th ed.
2008).
33. Id.

438

Global Business & Development Law Journal / Vol. 28
34

A spin-off is attractive to companies for a variety of reasons. It can
maximize shareholder value, unlock hidden value, increase revenue and attract
investors, and make the corporation “fit and focused” by reorganization, to name
35
a few. Historically, a spin-off has been used to facilitate mergers and
36
acquisitions by allowing a corporation to remove obstacles.
The spin-off can raise issues such as: non-assignable assets, relief from
liabilities, necessity of shareholder approval, fiduciary duties, tax, and securities
37
38
law rules. Particularly, spin-offs can be potentially dangerous to creditors.
Abusive spin-offs are not common, but they can be used to defraud creditors by a
39
fraudulent conveyance Creditors could lose their right to recourse because of
40
this fraudulent transfer. Legal safeguards for this potential abuse exist, but are
41
dependent on what country’s law is being applied.
B. The Kaisha Bunkatsu
The kaisha bunkatsu is an amendment originally adopted in the Japanese
42
Commercial Code in 2001. Japan’s laws relating to companies were originally
43
scattered throughout the Commercial Code. Then, in 2005, Japan enacted the
Companies Act (Kaisha-hou), which brought all the corporate legal provisions
44
into one consolidated law. The Companies Act came into effect on May 1,
45
46
2006 as the largest reform of its kind in 50 years. The rules under the
47
Companies Act are the responsibility of the Ministry of Justice in Japan. The

34. Adams & Mukherji, supra note 30, at 39.
35. Id. at 39–44.
36. Id. at 39.
37. See GEVURTZ, supra, note 32 at 862-68 (describing the potential issues and abuses of the transaction).
38. STEPHEN I. GLOVER, BUSINESS SEPARATION TRANSACTIONS SPIN-OFFS, SUBSIDIARY IPOS AND TRACKING
STOCK 14-4 (ALM Properties Inc., 2006), available at http://books.google.com/books?id=Rxhxsmw8u
6AC&printsec=frontcover &source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false.
39. Adams & Mukherji, supra note 30, at 27 (discussing abusive spin-offs and fraudulent conveyance
laws).
40. GLOVER, supra note 38; Adams & Mukherji, supra note 30, at 33–38
(discussing environmental fraudulent claims).
41. See infra Part IV.
42. ABA Section of Antitrust Law, supra note 12.
43. Kenichi Osugi, Companies Act-Overview, TRANSPARENCY OF JAPANESE LAW PROJECT, http://www.
tomeika.jur.kyushu-u.ac.jp/corporate/.
44. Id.; Hajime Lieno & Takashi Saito, Whole Business Securitizations are Gaining Strength, ASIALAW
(Aug. 2007), http://www.asialaw.com/Article/1989015/Whole-Business-Securitizations-Are-Gaining-Strength.
html?Print=true&Single=true.
45. The Japanese Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Corporate Disclosure in Japan Overview 5
(6th ed., 2010), available at https://www.hp.jicpa.or.jp/english/about/publications/pdf/PUBLICATIONOverview2010.pdf.
46. See Japan’s New Corporations Law to Become Effective May 1, 2006, O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP
(Mar. 29, 2006), http://www.omm.com/03-29-2006/.
47. Osugi, supra note 43.
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purpose of the Companies Act is to govern “[t]he formation, organization,
48
operation and management of companies.”
The Companies Act permits several different types of corporate
49
restructuring. The kaisha bunkatsu is a company split method whereby a
company either transfers all or some of their rights and obligations to a receiving
50
company (Kyûshû Bunkatsu) or a newly formed company (Shinsetsu Bunkatsu).
The Shinsetsu Bunkatsu is an incorporation demerger, meaning the parent
company incorporated a new company by the transfer of their assets and
51
liabilities from the parent company. The assets and liabilities are transferred as
52
an operation of law. There are two different kinds of incorporation-type
53
company splits provided in the Companies Act. The first is a split by which a
stock company is incorporated and the second is a split by which a membership
54
company is incorporated. Commonly, the first type is used in forming a newly
55
incorporated company.
The kaisha bunkatsu has provided a lawful way for failing Japanese
56
companies to restructure their company. Also, it allows a target company to
57
split the desired business into a separate company. The splitting of a target
company is useful when a bidder does not wish to acquire all of the target’s
58
businesses. The typical procedure of a company using the kaisha bunkatsu for
legitimate purposes begins with the parent company (splitting company)
59
transferring the healthy part of the business to the newly formed corporation,
followed by the splitting company selling the newly formed corporation’s shares
60
to a third party. Lastly, the splitting company pays the debts owed to creditors
with the money from the sale, as does the newly formed corporation from the
61
cash flow generated by the operation of the new business. It is not a statutory

48. KAISHA-HOU, supra note 21.
49. See id. (discussing part of the Companies Act setting out the regulations for entity conversions,
mergers, and company splits).
50. Wakabayashi & Muraji, supra note 13; HIDEKI KANDA, ET AL., TRANSFORMING CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE IN EAST ASIA 53 (Routledge, 2008).
51. Hines et al., supra note 9, at 390.
52. Id.
53. See ABA Section of Antitrust Law, supra note 12.
54. KAISHA-HOU, supra note 21, at 763, 765.
55. Wakabayashi & Muraji, supra note 13.
56. Id.
57. Yoshihiko Fuchibe, et al., Country Q&A Japan 267 (Global Counsel Mergers and Acquisitions
2003/04), http://www.tmi.gr.jp/wp-content/uploads/pdf/GCH_Mergers_and_Acquisitions_200304.pdf.
58. Id.
59. KAISHA-HOU, supra note 21, at 763, ¶ v; Wakabayashi & Muraji, supra note 13.
60. Wakabayashi & Muraji, supra note 13.
61. Id.
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requirement for the splitting company to consult with major creditors, but many
63
do as a gesture of good faith.
There are statutory corporate restructuring methods that are subject to
64
creditor protection procedures provided by the Companies Act; however, under
the kaisha bunkatsu, creditors who remain with the splitting company are not
65
66
protected. This results because the splitting company remains the guarantor
with no change to its financial situation, since the acquired shares of the newly
formed company result in it becoming the splitting company’s wholly owned
67
68
subsidiary. The company split differs from other merger methods because the
splitting company has the authority to choose the rights and obligations
69
transferred to the newly formed corporation and those that remain with it. Thus,
the splitting company is not required to obtain consent from or inform creditors
70
during the company split process.
C. The Business Spin-Off in the United States
71

This kind of transaction described above implicates state corporate law,
72
Internal Revenue Code (IRC) § 355, the 1933 Securities Act, and possibly
73
Article 6 of the U.C.C. The parent corporation spinning off a subsidiary
74
distributes the stock of the subsidiary to its shareholders. Even though the
distribution occurs without consideration, it is held to be a sale that triggers the
75
registration requirements of the 1933 Securities Act. Certain conditions must be
76
satisfied under IRC § 355 in order for the spin-off to be successful.
The spin-off may remove assets from the parent corporation, but it does not
77
reduce the parent corporation’s debt or capital. Even if the spin-off company
assumes part of the parent corporation’s debt, the parent corporation is still liable
62. See KAISHA-HOU, supra note 21, at 763(2)(Corporation Law).
63. Wakabayashi & Muraji, supra note 13.
64. Hines, supra note 10, at 390; Wakabayashi & Muraji, supra note 13.
65. Wakabayashi & Muraji, supra note 13.
66. KAISHA-HOU, supra note 21, at 764(Corporation Law).
67. See id.
68. Id.
69. KAISHA-HOU, supra note 21, at 764, ¶v-vii.
70. See Wakabayashi & Muraji, supra note 13.
71. GEVURTZ, supra note 32, at 864.
72. Adams & Mukherji, supra note 30, at 17.
73. See GEVURTZ, supra note 32, at 863.
74. See Michael L. Schler, Simplifying and Rationalizing the Spin-off Rules, 56 SMU L. REV. 239, 241
(2003).
75. GEVURTZ, supra note 32, at 863-66 (explaining the different laws that regulate a spin-off in the
United States, that are beyond the scope of this comment).
76. See, e.g., Schler, supra note 74, at 241 (providing a list of conditions, that are beyond the scope of my
comment).
77. GEVURTZ, supra note 32, at 864.
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to the creditor unless they receive a novation. This is why a creditor’s consent is
79
required for contracts containing anti-assignment provisions. A number of laws
80
protect creditors in spin-offs in the United States. Creditors can challenge the
81
spin-off because of a fraudulent transfer. This is likely to happen when a
82
creditor finds their option for payment is with the “bad” company. It is
especially vital that care is given in allocating debt and liabilities during a spinoff to ensure that the splitting company and the parent company are viable and
83
any solvency risks have been considered. Thus, planners should consider
84
creditors’ rights issues when preparing business spin-offs.
III. CREDITORS
Creditors play an important role in corporate governance because they have
85
control rights in a company. They influence major decisions of a company
86
through controls when a company either defaults or violates a debt covenant.
For example, creditors could impose sanctions over a company’s restructuring
87
such as mergers and acquisitions and spin-offs. However, the effectiveness of
88
creditors’ rights depends on their rights being enforceable in courts.
A. Transfer by Operation of Law in Japan
Japanese companies have used abusive company splits (ranyouteki-kaishabunkatsu) to protect the interest of their equity holders to the detriment of their
89
creditors. They are successful by using the kaisha bunkatsu in an evasive
90
manner. The company isolates the healthy business, out of reach of creditors,
91
into the newly formed company without informing creditors. This maneuver

78. Id.
79. See H. Justin Pace, Anti-Assignment Provisions, Copyright Licenses, and Intra-Group Mergers: The
Effect of Cincom v. Novelis, 9 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP 263, 265 (2010).
80. See infra Part III.B for further explanation of the laws protecting creditors.
81. BUSINESS SEPARATION TRANSACTIONS SPIN-OFFS, supra note 38; Adams & Mukherji, supra note 30,
at 33-38.
82. BUSINESS SEPARATION TRANSACTIONS SPIN-OFFS, supra note 38.
83. Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Spin-Off Guide, 13 (2013), available at http://www.wlrk.com/
files/2013/spinoffguide.pdf.
84. BUSINESS SEPARATION TRANSACTIONS SPIN-OFFS, supra note 38.
85. Juzhong Zhuang, Some Conceptual Issues of Corporate Governance, 13 ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK
6 (June 1999).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Wakabayashi & Muraji, supra note 13.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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differs from with other types of demergers in Japan that require disclosure and
92
mandatory procedures to protect creditors.
The advantage of using the kaisha bunkatsu is the ability to transfer
contractual rights and obligations as an operation of law without the consent of
93
counterparties and creditors. The Ministry of Japan’s goal was to streamline the
process and not require the company to negotiate consent from each contractual
94
party. However, the kaisha bunkatsu protects creditors by requiring the splitting
company to provide notice to creditors being transferred to the newly formed
95
company. The creditor has the right to object to the transfer during the notice
96
period, but failing to object results in the consent from the creditor. Creditors
who object are provided alternative measures such as: repayment, appropriate
collateral to secure their obligation, or sufficient assets are placed in a trust to
97
secure repayment. This protection is only available to creditors being
98
transferred and not to such creditors who remain with the splitting company.
Unknowingly, with the enactment of the kaisha bunkatsu, the Ministry of
99
Japan created separate protections for creditors. It is debatable whether there is
a practical value in the notice requirement because the splitting company’s rights
100
and obligations are succeeded and not assigned to the newly formed company.
The power given to the splitting company to choose which rights and obligations
101
to keep and transfer inevitably creates a potential detriment to creditors. As
explained in more detail below, a creditor remaining with the splitting company
could lose recourse to the newly formed company when a splitting company sells
102
the newly formed company to a third party. A splitting company could file for
bankruptcy or simply abandon the company leaving the creditor with few
103
options.
The creditor remaining with the splitting company could sue or force the
splitting company into bankruptcy, but the valuable assets will be untouchable
104
because they are with the newly formed company. Basically, the splitting

92. Hines, supra note 10, at 390.
93. Why Japan’s New Corporate Separation Law is Increasing Restructurings, supra note 8.
94. Id.
95. See KAISHA-HOU, supra note 21, at 764(2)(Corporation Law).
96. See Id. at §10(1) ¶ii (Corporation Law); Why Japan’s New Corporate Separation Law is Increasing
Restructurings, supra note 8.
97. Shareholder and Creditor Protection in Japanese Mergers, THE JAPAN TAX SITE (Feb. 7, 2011),
http://japantax.org/?p=4355; KAISHA-HOU, supra note 21, at 789(5), 799(5).
98. Wakabayashi & Muraji, supra note 13
99. See KAISHA-HOU, supra note 21, at 764(2) (describing which creditors requires notice).
100. See id. at 763, ¶v; Why Japan’s New Corporate Separation Law is Increasing Restructurings, supra
note 8.
101. See Wakabayashi & Muraji, supra note 13.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id.
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company “foist[ed] all [its] debt on an empty shell” while the valuable business
105
continues to make money free of debt. This is profitable for the splitting
company because it can now sell the newly formed company free of
106
encumbrances. This is important because usually buyers only want to acquire
107
the profitable division of the Japanese company.
B. Transfer by Operation of Law in California
Conversely, California corporate law specifically protects against this
108
potential abuse of power by a splitting company. A number of laws in the
United States such as state fraudulent conveyances laws, the Bankruptcy Code,
and the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act also protect creditors in a spin109
off. Upon a merger, all the rights of creditors and all liens are preserved and
110
unimpaired. Further, if a corporation disappears, any action or proceeding
against it will be prosecuted and the judgment will bind the surviving
111
corporation. The parent company remains liable to a creditor without a
112
novation despite the transfer of obligations to the newly formed company.
A creditor left with the splitting company has the right to bring a suit against
113
the newly formed company by claiming fraudulent conveyance. The transfer
without fair consideration to the splitting company is a fraudulent conveyance if
114
the splitting company is insolvent or left without sufficient capital. The transfer
can also be found to be fraudulent if the debtor made the transfer of the splitting
115
company with the actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud the creditor.
116
Further, the Bankruptcy Code protects the creditor. If the splitting company
files bankruptcy, the bankruptcy trustee or debtor in possession has the authority

105. Hiroyuki Yagi & Masakazu Kaji, Escaping your Debts in Japan, ZJAPANR 259, 261 (2003).
106. Id.; Wakabayashi & Muraji, supra note 13.
107. See How to buy a Japanese Company, IFLR (Jan. 28, 2003), http://www.iflr.com/Article/
2026998/How-to-buy-a-Japanese-company.html.
108. Cal. Corp. Code §1107 (Deering 2014); Cal. Corp. Code § 1113 (Deering 2014).
109. See generally 11 U.S.C.S. §548 (2014); Corp. §1107; Cal. Civ. Code §3439.04 (Deering 2014).
110. Corp. §1107; Corp. §1113.
111. Corp. §1107; Corp. §1113.
112. GEVURTZ, supra note 32.
113. Economy Refining & Serv. Co., Inc. v. Royal National Bank of New York, 20 Cal.App.3d 434, 439
(1st Dist. 1971).
114. Cal. Civ. Code §3439.04(a)(2) (Deering 2014).
115. See Civ. §3439.04(a)(1); see also Civ. §3439.04(b) for the factors to determine the actual intent of
the debtor.
116. See generally Thomas H. Day, Solution for Conflict of Laws Governing Fraudulent Transfers: Apply
the Law That Was Enacted to Benefit the Creditors, 48 BUS. LAW. 889, 900, (1992-1993) (describing how the
bankruptcy code is used).
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to avoid the fraudulent transfer under applicable state law.
118
safeguards protect against abusive spin-offs.

117

These legal

C. Abuse of Creditors in Japan
Small and mid-sized Japanese companies usually owned by individuals or
family members have successfully utilized the kaisha bunkatsu in an evasive
119
manner. There are a number of different ways the Japanese company can
120
defraud a creditor. The Japanese splitting company decides to transfer its rights
and creditor obligations pertaining to the valuable part of the business to the
121
newly formed company. Then, the splitting company decides whether it will
transfer some creditors, all creditors, or no creditors to the newly formed
122
company. Normally, the creditors left with the splitting company are not
123
informed of this process.
Once the newly formed company is established, the splitting company’s
owners begin the process of separating themselves from the newly formed
124
company. This part of the splitting process is where the defrauding of creditors
125
occurs. The owners of the splitting company will sell the newly formed
126
company to one of their family members for a nominal value. This method is
127
simply used to legally relinquish control of the newly formed company, thus
allowing the original owners to maintain their ties to the valuable newly formed
128
company without the encumbrances left with the splitting company. This
method of fraud can be taken one step further when the family members decide
to sell a large number of the new shares to an equity sponsor, who could be a
consultant or other family members, thereby allowing the owners of the splitting
129
company to effectively shift economic control over the newly formed company.
Finally, the owners of the splitting company will either commence bankruptcy
proceedings or abandon the company, thus leaving the creditor with limited
130
options for recourse.

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (2014).
Adams & Mukherji, supra note 30.
Wakabayashi & Muraji, supra note 13.
See supra Part III.A.
Wakabayashi & Muraji, supra note 13.
KANDA, supra note 50; see also Wakabayshi & Muraji, supra note 13.
See supra Part III.A.
See Wakabayashi & Muraji, supra note 13.
See supra Part III.A.
Wakabayashi & Muraji, supra note 13.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra Part III.A.
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Japan and California have similar fraudulent conveyance and bankruptcy
131
laws when dealing with fraudulent acts of companies. In California, the
creditors would be able to contest the transfer of the newly formed company to
132
the owner’s family members under fraudulent conveyance laws. If the owner of
the splitting company files for bankruptcy, the trustee or debtor in possession can
deem the transfer of the newly formed company fraudulent allowing creditors
133
recourse from the company. Also, abandoning the splitting company would
allow creditors to bring their claims for recourse against the newly formed
134
company. Conversely, in Japan, even with similar protections, the creditors left
with the splitting company have limited recourse options dependent on certain
135
courts.
The Companies Act contains a provision applicable to a business transfer that
holds the transferee of the business transfer liable for the transferor’s obligations
136
to creditors. However, this provision does not apply to a statutory company
137
split method (including the kaisha bunkatsu). Certain Japanese courts have
allowed creditors to avoid fraudulent transfers under the fraudulent acts and
138
bankruptcy act of the Civil Code. The courts recognize that the Companies Act
139
does not provide any protection to creditors. However, other courts argue the
140
Civil Code is not applicable because the Companies Act has its own provisions.
Thus, a creditor with the splitting company is guaranteed protection in California,
141
but is provided limited protection in Japan.
IV. CONSIDERATION OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
A. Creditor Brings Suit
Creditors have no domestic solution in Japan when a company uses the
142
kaisha bunkatsu and leaves the creditor with the splitting company. A creditor
evaluating its options looks to see if there is a difference between the United
143
States and Japanese laws. This could create a forum shopping issue because a
creditor would want to bring a case in the United States since the law is more
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
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favorable towards creditors compared to Japan. However, the choice of forum
145
does not always dictate the choice of law. Thus, if a creditor brings a claim
against a United States corporation the courts could be faced with a conflict of
laws issue, which is illustrated by the hypothetical provided below.
Suppose a creditor from California (creditor) decides to loan money to a
146
Japanese company (Company A). Company A is not as profitable as it hoped to
147
be, but one part of the business is profitable. Company A decides to unlock the
hidden value of this business and uses the kaisha bunkatsu to create Company
148
B. Company A chooses to use the kaisha bunkatsu because it wants Company
149
B to be unencumbered, making it attractive to potential buyers. Company A
then sells Company B to a corporation located in California (Company C).
150
Company A is abandoned leaving with it all of its debts. The creditor has no
recourse in Company A and decides to bring his claim against Company C who
151
purchased Company B. Company C argues it should not be held liable because
152
it acquired Company B free of encumbrances from Company A.
In the example above, the California court will be faced with a conflict of
laws issue since Company B was incorporated in Japan, but was acquired by a
153
California corporation. A creditor in California has a right to bring a fraudulent
154
conveyance claim, but a creditor in Japan does not have this protective right.
However, in this case it is a California creditor bringing the claim and the court
must decide whether it will apply Japan’s or California’s corporation laws, and
depending on whose laws apply, whether or not Company C is liable for
Company A’s debt.
B. Court’s Discussion
1. Internal Affairs Doctrine
Applying the Internal Affairs Doctrine allows the court to determine which
155
state’s law applies in the case. The Internal Affairs Doctrine says the state of
144. See supra Part III.A–B.
145. See infra Part IV.B.2 (illustrating different laws the courts consider with choice of laws).
146. See, e.g., Brian Shappell, Japanese Manufacturer Moves to Protect Itself from U.S. Creditors,
NACME-SE, http://blog.nacm.org/2012/03/japanese-manufacturer-moves-to-protect.html.
147. Adams & Mukherji, supra note 30, at 15, 39–44.
148. Id.
149. See Yagi & Kaji, supra note 105; see also Wakabayashi & Muraji, supra note 13.
150. Yagi & Kaji, supra note 105.
151. See Wakabayashi & Muraji, supra note 13.
152. Yagi & Kaji, supra note 106; Wakabayashi, supra note 13.
153. See generally Willis L. M. Reese, Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second, 28 Law and
Contemporary Problems, 679, 697 (Fall 1963), available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/lcp/vol28/iss4/2.
154. See supra Part III.
155. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 (1971).
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incorporation governs the rights and liabilities of a corporation. It is a conflict
of law principle allowing only one state the authority to regulate a corporation’s
157
internal affairs. However, courts differ on the application of this principal
158
because of the distinction of what qualifies as an internal affair. Thus, the
creditor would need to prove its right is an internal affair in order for the
159
principal to apply.
However, courts in California are not permitted to control the internal affairs
160
of foreign corporations. The internal affairs of a corporation have been
recognized as matters relating to the relationships of the corporation and its
161
officers, directors, and shareholders. It focuses on the organic structure or
162
internal administration of a corporation. The creditor’s right would not be
considered an internal affair because the right is not connected to the company’s
incorporation steps such as: issuance of shares, holding director and
163
shareholders’ meetings, charter amendments, etc. Based on this application of
the Internal Affairs Doctrine the court would apply Japan’s law because the state
164
of incorporation governs the liabilities of the corporation and the creditor
165
would have no protective right to bring the suit against the California company.
However, California courts recognize there are certain exceptions to the
166
Internal Affairs Doctrine. In the interest of justice, a local court could apply the
167
local law over the Internal Affairs Doctrine. This could be done because
California has an interest in protecting its residents against fraud with the sale of
168
corporations. The court could apply local law when it finds the foreign
169
corporation has its principal place of business in the local state. The creditor
could make a strong argument using both exceptions. The creditor could prove
Company A deliberately used the kaisha bunkatsu to create Company B without
170
encumbrances. This deliberate act by Company A is a fraudulent action
171
California courts would want to protect their residents from. Further, the
156. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 (1971).
157. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982).
158. Id.; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 114 Cal. App.4th 434, 442-44 (2d Dist. 2003);
Vaughn v. LJ Int’l, Inc., 174 Cal. App. 4th 213, 226-27 (2d Dist. 2009).
159. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 645; State Farm, 114 Cal. App. 4th at 442-44; Vaughn, 174 Cal. App. 4th at 226-27.
160. Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Sobieski, 191 Cal. App. 2d 399, 408 (2d Dist. 1961).
161. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 645.
162. State Farm, 114 Cal. App. 4th at 443.
163. Id.
164. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 (1971).
165. Supra Part III.A.
166. Western Air Lines, 191 Cal. App. 2d 399; Friese v. Superior Court, 134 Cal. App. 4th 693 (4th Dist.
2005).
167. Friese, 134 Cal. App. 4th at 708.
168. Friese, 134 Cal. App. 4th at 708.
169. 9 WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CAL. LAW (10th), Corp. § 239.
170. Yagi & Kaji, supra note 106; Wakabayashi, supra note 13.
171. 9 WITKIN, supra, note 169.
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creditor could prove Company B’s principal place of business is in California
172
since it was acquired by a California corporation. The court would exercise
jurisdiction because making the creditor bring suit against Company B in Japan
would be an inappropriate and inconvenient forum since Company B’s business
173
records are in California. Based on this application of the Internal Affairs
Doctrine the court would apply California’s law and the creditor would have a
174
protective right to bring a fraudulent claim against Company C.
2. Applying California’s Law
175

The court will not necessarily apply California law. The Internal Affairs
Doctrine is one approach the court will consider when determining choice of
176
law. The court may additionally look at the First Restatement or the Second
177
Restatement pertaining to conflict of laws. The First Restatement follows a
178
rules approach while the Second Restatement applies a balancing test. The First
Restatement does not seek to determine whether there is a valid contract until it
179
determines the place of the principal event. The place of the principal event is
vital because it is the law of the place of contracting that determines the validity
180
of the contract. The Second Restatement allows for the contracting parties to
181
include a choice of law provision in their contract. However, absent a choice of
law provision, the choice of law is determined by which state has the most
182
significant relationship to the transaction. The factors the court balances are:
“(a) the place of contracting, (b) the place of negotiation of the contract, (c) the
place of performance, (d) the location of the subject matter of the contract, and
(e) the domicil[e], residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of
183
business of the parties.” Further, if the place of negotiation and performance
184
are in the same state, then that state’s law will apply.

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Supra Part IV.A.
9 Witkin, supra, note 169.
See Western Airlines, Inc. v. Sobieski, 191 Cal. App. 2d 399, 409-11 (2d Dist. 1961).
See id.
See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS (1971); RESTATEMENT OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934).
177. Id.
178. See generally William M. Richman & David Riley, The First Restatement of Conflict of Laws on
Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of its Successor: Contemporary Practice in Traditional Courts, 56 MD. L. REV. 1196
(1997) (comparing the First and Second Restatements differences).
179. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 311 cmt. d (1934).
180. Id.
181. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. a (1971).
182. Reese, supra note 153, at 697.
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If the court looks to either of the conflict of law Restatements, the creditor
186
might be left with no recourse because it would apply Japan’s laws. The First
Restatement analysis focuses on where the right vested, and particularly with
187
contracts, the place of the creation of the contract. Thus, Japan’s law would
apply because the contract was created in Japan, thereby vesting the creditor’s
188
rights in Japan. The Second Restatement analysis provides a complex balancing
189
test of different factors, assuming the creditor and Company A did not have a
choice of law provision in their contract. This is a case-by-case determination
190
and a highly factual application. Thus, balancing the factors, the court could
apply Japan’s law. However, policy reasons behind the Restatement—state of
dominant interest and to seek justice—could move the court to apply California
191
law.
Assuming the court determines California’s corporation law applies (local
192
law), the court is left with the task to determine whether this conveyance was
193
fraudulent and if Company C is liable for Company A’s debt. The kaisha
194
bunkatsu allows for Company A to create Company B without encumbrances.
However, California law does not permit Company A to create Company B to the
195
detriment of creditors.
Company C typically does not assume Company A’s liability unless the
transfer of Company B to Company C is for the fraudulent purpose of escaping
196
liability for Company A’s debts. Company A used the kaisha bunkatsu to
unlock the hidden value of its company by creating Company B and retaining all
197
the debt. Company A then sold Company B to Company C, which prohibited
recourse for the creditor because Company B held the valuable assets of
198
199
Company A. Company A deliberately sold Company B to hinder the creditor.
Thus, the creditor is left without many options because of this fraudulent
200
conveyance. Company C argues it did not purchase Company B with the intent
185. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS (1971); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934).
186. See supra Part III.A (discussing Japan’s laws pertaining to creditors).
187. See Richman & Riley, supra note 178, at 1197–98.
188. See supra Part IV.B.1.
189. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188(2) (1971).
190. See generally Reese, supra note 153 (describing the policy reasons of each factor considered in
Restatement Second and providing examples of how different courts apply them).
191. See id. at 688 & 690.
192. See supra Part IV.B.1.
193. See supra Part IV.A.
194. See supra Part II.A.
195. See supra Part III.B.
196. Beatrice Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 6 Cal. 4th 767, 778 (1993).
197. See supra Part IV.A.
198. See Wakabayashi & Muraji, supra note 13.
199. Fox v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 137 Cal. App. 3d 524, 527 (1982).
200. See supra Part III.C.
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to defraud the creditor since it believed Company B was free of encumbrances.
The court is unlikely to accept this argument because Company A was
201
abandoned. Company C will be held liable if the predecessor corporation
202
disappears. Therefore, the creditor could potentially bring an action against
203
Company A and the judgment would be binding on Company C. The court is
likely to hold Company C liable for Company A’s debts because it acquired
204
Company B, which was created with the intent to foist off Company A’s debts.
V. PROPOSED SOLUTION
The potential abuse of the kaisha bunkatsu by major corporations raises a
205
significant issue. The above hypothetical illustrates the distinction between
206
Japanese and Californian corporate laws. Japan’s law places the California
courts in the difficult position of determining whether to adopt international law
207
or to apply California law to protect a California creditor. Even though the
208
kaisha bunkatsu benefits Japanese corporate restructuring, certain aspects of it
should be amended or California courts need to determine how to enforce it.
A. Japan Amends the Kaisha Bunkatsu
Amending the kaisha bunkatsu is the best solution for the issues presented.
The Ministry of Japan is aware of the statutory flaws regarding creditors with the
209
kaisha bunkatsu. It considered amending the Companies Act to address these
210
issues. However, other corporate scandals involving Japanese corporations
occurred in 2011, which changed the Ministry of Japan’s focus to amending the
211
Companies Act. The proposed amendments to the kaisha bunkatsu have not
212
been approved. The Ministry of Japan’s proposed amendments focus on the
213
rights of creditors left with the splitting company. The amendment provides
creditors, harmed by the company split, the ability to exercise their rights against

201. See supra Part IV.A.
202. See Cal. Corp. Code §1107(a) (West 2007); Cal. Corp. Code §1113(i)(3) (West 2006).
203. See Cal. Corp. Code §1107(d) (West 2007); Cal. Corp. Code §1113(i)(3) (West 2006).
204. Yagi & Kaji, supra note 105, at 261.
205. See supra Part I.
206. See supra Part IV.
207. See supra Part IV.
208. Why Japan’s New Corporate Separation Law is Increasing Restructurings, supra note 8.
209. See Wakabayashi & Muraji, supra note 13.
210. See id.
211. See Takashi Toichi & Takeshi Fukatsu, Japan’s New Corporate Governance Considerations, IFLR
(Mar. 20, 2013), http://www.iflr.com/Article/3187448/Japans-new-corporate-governance-considerations.html.
212. Id. (discussing the recent amendments made to the Companies Act).
213. See Wakabayashi & Muraji, supra note 13.
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the newly incorporated company. The Ministry of Japan should adopt this
amendment because it will aid in ending the abusive company splits by
215
businesses using the kaisha bunkatsu.
B. Options for the California Courts
1. Do Not Recognize the Demerger
216

California courts are not required to enforce international law. The courts
have the authority to determine the choice of law to apply determined by the
217
Internal Affairs Doctrine. In this event, California has an interest in protecting
their creditors and its public policy would be offended if it applied Japanese
218
law. If the court holds the Internal Affairs Doctrine inapplicable then it will
219
apply California’s corporation laws. Since California’s corporation laws
regarding spin-offs are in conflict with Japan’s Companies Act regarding kaisha
220
bunkatsu, the court could focus on the legality of the demerger in Japan.
Applying California corporate law would invalidate the demerger because it was
221
created to the detriment of creditors. Thus, the court would not recognize the
222
newly incorporated company from the splitting company.
Not recognizing the demerger and invalidating the newly formed company
creates a significant issue for the splitting company, purchasing company, and
223
creditor.
The newly formed company is left in limbo because it is
224
acknowledged in Japan, but not in California. This action does not solve the
225
creditor’s problem because it will not have recourse in Japan or California. The
creditor is left with the original problem of recovering debt from the newly
226
incorporated company. Further, the purchasing company is left with an
227
invalidated sale. The purchasing company cannot legally buy the newly
incorporated company because the California court does not recognize the newly

214. See id.
215. See id.
216. See generally Vaughan v. LJ Int’l, Inc., 174 Cal. App. 4th 213 (2009) (discussing what law to apply
in the circumstances).
217. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 (1971).
218. See generally Vaughan, 174 Cal. App. 4th at 226 (explaining why California law did not apply).
219. See supra Part IV.B.1.
220. See supra Parts II, III.
221. See supra Part III.B.
222. See supra Part III.B.
223. See supra Part IV (illustrating how the kaisha bunkatsu affects the splitting company, purchasing
company, and creditor).
224. See supra Part III (comparing the difference between Japan and California law).
225. See Wakabayashi & Muraji, supra note 13.
226. See id.
227. See id.
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incorporated company (as if the company does not exist). This extreme action
by the California courts would affect the global economy because California
229
corporations will not be able to purchase demerged Japanese companies.
However, this action could create an economic incentive for Japan to amend the
kaisha bunkatsu because it limits the number of potential purchasers and
230
creditors.
2. Recognize the Demerger
The kaisha bunkatsu has been used successfully for Japanese corporate
231
restructuring by major corporations. If the California courts decide to not
recognize the kaisha bunkatsu this would negatively impact future valid Japanese
232
corporate restructurings. The purpose of the kaisha bunkatsu is to facilitate
233
corporate restructurings not to defraud creditors. However, the statutory flaws
234
in the kaisha bunkatsu allow for potential abuse from the splitting company.
This is an important distinction because the Ministry of Japan did not knowingly
235
create this potential for abuse. Therefore, the California court should recognize
the kaisha bunkatsu but create a protection to creditors regarding the recourse of
debt.
The California court should validate the demerger by the splitting company
using the kaisha bunkatsu even if it applies California’s corporation laws after
236
the choice of law determination.
The court should apply California’s
corporation laws to protect the creditor from the splitting company’s fraudulent
237
conveyance. The creditor should be allowed to make a claim against the newly
238
incorporated company even though it has been sold to an acquiring company.
This is fair to the acquiring company because it should have done its due
diligence in forming the newly incorporated company before completing the
239
purchase. The acquiring company should not be protected against the creditor
because Japan allowed the newly incorporated company to be formed without

228. GLOVER, supra note 38.
229. Id.
230. See generally Why Japan’s New Corporate Separation Law is Increasing Restructurings, supra note
8 (explaining the benefits of the kaisha bunkatsu).
231. See supra Part I.
232. Why Japan’s New Corporate Separation Law is Increasing Restructurings, supra note 9.
233. Wakabayashi & Muraji, supra note 13.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. See supra Part IV (illustrating the results when a court recognizes the demerger).
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encumbrances. The acquiring company in California is aware of the laws to
protect a creditor from a disappearing corporation and how a newly incorporated
241
company cannot be formed to hinder creditors. The California court has to
apply California’s corporation laws to protect creditors because if it were to
242
apply only Japan’s law, public policy would be offended.
C. Adopting the Kaisha Bunkatsu
The kaisha bunkatsu was created by the Ministry of Japan to streamline the
243
demerger process. The Ministry’s intentions were to allow failing Japanese
companies to restructure quickly without having to negotiate with each individual
244
creditor or counterparty. The enactment of the Bunkatsu Law led to more than
245
300 reported transactions utilizing the new kaisha bunkatsu process. Other
countries should adopt the kaisha bunkatsu because it provides a statutory
246
demerger, allowing companies to successfully restructure and unlock hidden
247
value of their businesses without requiring third party consent. This process
allows companies to quickly and successfully restructure their businesses, which
248
furthers the country’s economic development and lessens its bankruptcy cases.
However, if a country decides to adopt the kaisha bunkatsu it should be aware of
249
the potential abuse towards creditors.
The Ministry of Japan unknowingly created separate protections for creditors
depending on whether the creditor remained with the splitting company or newly
250
formed company. This was an oversight by the Ministry of Japan because the
Companies Act provides a protection to creditors applicable to a business
251
transfer. However, the kaisha bunkatsu is considered a statutory company split
and not a business transfer, which leaves the creditors with the splitting company
252
unprotected. Japan’s courts are trying to alleviate this situation by attempting to
apply their fraudulent conveyance laws and bankruptcy laws, but the courts are

240. Cal. Corp. Code §1107 (West 2007); Cal. Corp. Code §1113 (West 2006) (acquiring company is
held liable if the predecessor company disappears).
241. See supra Part III.B.
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lacking in uniformity. Some courts hold the newly formed company can be
held liable for the splitting company’s creditor obligations, but others hold the
fraudulent conveyance and bankruptcy laws cannot apply since the Companies
254
Act provides its own protection provisions. Thus, a country should focus on the
legal mistakes made by the Ministry of Japan before it adopts the kaisha
255
bunkatsu.
If a country chooses to adopt the kaisha bunkatsu, the legislature needs to
modify the procedure. Even though the kaisha bunkatsu allows a company to
256
demerge without the consent of third parties, the third parties’ obligations
257
should still be protected. Unlike in Japan, California protects creditors through
258
its corporation laws, bankruptcy laws, and fraudulent conveyance laws. Japan
has similar laws, but the protection provisions in the Companies Act trump
259
them. A country with a similar legal system to Japan should provide creditors,
whether with the splitting company or newly formed company, harmed by the
260
demerger the right to bring a claim against the newly formed company. The
legislature needs to focus on the potential defrauding of creditors in order to
261
successfully adopt the kaisha bunkatsu. Adopting the kaisha bunkatsu could
262
eliminate impediments to business restructurings, which in turn furthers the
263
country’s economic development.
VI. CONCLUSION
The kaisha bunkatsu is an important tool for corporate restructurings in
264
Japan. Unfortunately, the successful abuse of the kaisha bunkatsu by mid-size
and family owned Japanese businesses establish the potential abuse by major
265
corporations. Creditors left with the splitting company are subject to the
266
possibility of no recourse in Japan. Creditors from California who invest in
Japanese companies will be unprotected if the Japanese company utilizes the
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kaisha bunkatsu. The Ministry of Japan should pass amendments to the kaisha
bunkatsu allowing creditors harmed by the splitting company the right of
268
recourse against the newly formed company. Nevertheless, if Japan does not
amend the kaisha bunkatsu, the California courts should recognize the newly
formed company but allow creditors the right to a claim against the newly
269
formed company. In order for the kaisha bunkatsu to continue to be a
legitimate Japanese corporate restructuring tool, these suggestions should be
taken into account.

267. See supra Part IV.
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269. See supra Part V.
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